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ABSTRACT 
chaptel; a legitimacy ji-mnework for envirol1­onIn this } theoryilin-z  i-OJ eHJOr corporate.f  
mental empirically /Ising multi-casedisclosuren1e J  is investigated,n1piri  alls  researchnl /r -   
Legitimation 1991 anl1ual reports of twodesign. strategiesln  in the to/  1995 n rT q \1JO 
Canadian-owned companies Thepulp. -o'vv  and paper are}n  explored. findings7/l   
legitimacy Fir environmentalsupport theoryhn  as an explanation voluntary.{o  irOJ1.nulnlol 
disclosu inre  annual reports.r
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigateselnpirically m a legitilnacym  theory franleworkm  for 
multi-casevoluntary environmental disclosure in annual reports. A researchnl   
design is tollsed  identify strategieslegitinlation  in the annual reports of two 
pulp and paper companies over a live-year 
u m
Canadian-owned 0111pani  period.f   The 
primary determineobjectivenl  is to whethernn   voluntary disclosures of environ­
ll1ental ininfornlation  annual reports are strategic toattenlpts  counter perceived 
extant potential chaJlenges legitinlacy,m  fronl 
me t m m
or ofl  organizational arising m
environment.corporate activities impacting the natural irorul1  
Decision-usefulness and theorieseconolnic  have been used in toattenlpts  
explain voluntary corporate social disclosure (CSD), but have generally proved 
m m
1995a;] 95a~ a!.,restrictive andl  unsatisfactory (Gray et a1.,I  Gray elt 1987,I   63-90, 
Mathews, 1993, 2-4,1988; \v 1998;93,   Preston, 1975; Puxty, 1986; Savage, 1998). 
A rnoldm  (1990) posits that the field of CSD is devoid of any substantive, 
Ullmann (1985,theoretical foundation, and n1 ] 555)  describes CSD as "empirical 
attemptsdata  in search of an adequate theory." This chapter toln   further develop 
empirical framework.and provide supportrn  for an underlying theoretical an1 \V  
phenomenonA  possible explanation for the increasing ofrn   voluntary CSD is 
legitimacy et a!., 1995a;the corporate quest for organizational (seeilin1  Gray I
Hogner, 1982; 1993,Mathe\\.'s,  217; Patten, 1991, 1992; Puxty, 1986;rl ] w ] ; 
Lowe, legitimacyRichardson,  1987; Savage, 1998; Tinker &  1980).ovv'   A state of inl  
is attained when societal perceptions of corporate behavior are congruent with 
[environmental]societal expectations of corporate activityl nl J  (Dowling & Pfeffer, 
state,~ legitimation are al1empts to1975). To achieve this strategiesrn  used in ttenl
justify with society.corporatetiC  coexistence \v ty'  
AustralianAlthough one accounting study involving an corporation  failed to 
legitimacy frameworksupport  a theory] nul  (Guthrier rn   &  Parker, 1989), at least seven 
studies have successfully used a conceptual definition of theorylegitinlacy  tom
(Hogner, 1982;explain CSD  in annual reports a Guthrie:  &  Parker, 1990; Patten, 
1992;~ 1998).Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Deegan &  Rankin, 1996, 1997; Buhr, ] . 
None of  these identify measures of legitilnacy.m  There is no satisfactoryrn
competing phenomenonalternative or  theory0l11peti  to explain the ofen0l11 O   voluntary CSD, 
although twoVv'O conlp]ernentary theories, theory pol i ticalJ m l m stakeholder.  and l l 
economy identilied a!., 1995a;5a~ Buhr, 1998).theory,CO 0l11Y  have been (Grayf  et I
eighth study, conducted by Neu et a!. (1998), examinedAn  1 33n1   public 
companies overrn  a ten-year period (1982 to 1991), operating in four 
'environmentally-sensitive' firmsindustries."environnlentall -  Six of these werern1   in the pulp and 
paper  industry. regressionT'heir model used an environmental issues-basedtTIod   
annual report word count as the dependent variable and itsexalnined  relation 
to seven examined 
m
independent variables. Three of the independent variables n1  
the of: articles addressing environmentally-based finesfrequencies (I) nl
(2)(FINES),  general environmental (MEDIA),criticisn1s  and (3) published 
Canadian  newspaper and periodical articles (SOCIETY). The predicted signs 
ofr significanti i (atf   the I%l  level) coefficients for these variablesindep'endent  were 
f ticism
either  'assumed' or not fully developed in the paper, and were also not; su111c '
inconsistent  direction.l
present'The  study also focuses on FINES, MEDIA and SOCIETY variables,
but sodoes  on a di fferent anddinlension,  is based on the thatassulnption  the 
technologyl  does not presently exist to perform 
c10e  m m
quantitativeforn1  analyses on 
legit iirnacy theory for111otivation  corporate disclosure.envirol11nental . There­motivati  ironm  
Core,r , t exhis  p lanatoryl t  st ud usesy  a structuredt t  case studyt  approach tot  ex alnineI i  t  mi  
environmental which formcorporate disclosure,rn  is\v  the fastest growing ofnl  CSD 
aI., media(Gray, 1993, 1994; Gray et 1993,l  181, 1995a). Adverse reports111edi   are 
measure legitimacyused as an indirect of111easur  (seenl   Savage, 1998). The results are 
withconsistent the\v   hypothesis. 
The next Section presents a synopsis of the theory. Section III describes the 
research design. Section IV presents the case evidence and Section V specifies 
limitations. nnalthe j Then1it ti  Sectionfi   concludes the study. 
LEGITIMACY THEORY1"I  FRAMEWORK 
Savage (1998) provides an extensive literature review and an organizational 
legitimacy theorylll  franleworkm  to explain corporate disclosureenvironnlental m
from terms legitimacyanl  social contract perspective. In ofrnlS  theory,giti111   organizations 
toatten1pt  establish congruence between the social values associaLed or\vith  
implied bynl  their [environmental] activities,ln J  and the nOrI11S 
m sociat  w  
orms and values of the 
which (Dowling Pfeffer, Theysociety of they\v  are part &v./l  1975).1l  doI'   this by using 
strategieslegitinlation  to justify their coexistence the\vith  public-at-Iarge and 
to their economic \vhichw  for long-ternl 
m w
continue pursuits,rn  provides their t m 
survival. If this balance is even legitimacyperceived to be disturbed, a gapinl   
arises. But, is]egitin1acy  difficult to n1easure. 
Savage (1998) argues that nevvsw  reportsI1ledia me  are indicators of societal 
norms from 
l im me
andr1115  values, and provides references for this position theln  sociology,, 
organizational theory, and accounting literature BasedstreanlS. ams  on this, if a 
perceived threat to the larger collective social interest arises because of the 
actions of an organization, the of]egitinlacy  the organization and/or its industry 
news media 
l m
will be challenged in the news 111edia,medi  in the fornlm of' adverse n1  
media delinedreports. An adverse news report111edi  is asf   one that reflects negatively 
on  the activitiesenvironn1ental  of the OncecOll1pany.  a gaplegitirnacy  has beenm ompa tim
identified by one or adverse1110re  reports,111edia  and organizational Jegit.in1acymor medi l it m  
challenged, corporations would select one, or a ofc0J11binatioIl,  legitilllationombinati n  itim  
strategies to close the existing or perceived gap.legitinlacy  The 111agnitude orm magnit  f 
a gaplegjlirnacy  would be reflected by the ofnUl1lber  adverse reportsrnedia  
giving rise to the gap.. Because the annual reports of public corporations are 
it m um m  
generally accepted as a channel of toCOlllll1unication  interested of111enlbers communicat  memb  
society, they represent a logical (but not the sole) for111ediuJ11  legitinlation­me um m
relatedl t  (forcon1111unications  supportt of thist i  position,iti , see Deegan & Rankin,i ,mmunicati  
1995~1997,580;, ; Flinn,li , Robertsont  &  Nicolson,i l , 1996).. 
Environmental legitimation isl itin1 ti  i  thereforet  a cyclicaldynanlic, li l process of 
; 
i rn t l mi , 
environmental termscontinuingti i  societali t l appraisalr i l off corporater r t  activitiesir nn1 t I ti iti  ini  oft rnlS f 
prevailingili  andnornlS  values.l . If a gaplegitiluacy  isi  perceived,i , adverse nlediams l itim  m i  
reponing will fol1ow. legitimacy,rt J Onl  perceiving a threat to organizational atin1   
Communicationcorporation will invoke one or more strategies to close the gap. 0l111TIUnicati  
will medium.to society theni,II  take place, with the annual report as one The111edi lTI   next 
legitimation corporation inaymsection describes the various strategieslll  that a 
choose to employ. 
Legitimation Strategiesln  
The organizational theoryi J  literature identifies nine legitilTIationitim t  strategies. 
with method employed,Consistent  thevv'it  research 111etho threenl   additional strategies were 
identified during the course of this study. The three new contributions to the 
accounting literature are not pre-specified, but are included in this section for 
completeness legitimation mayandOJllplete  ease of reference only. The 12 strategiestin1  bel11a   
classified into two broad categories of legitimation activity. These are: 
(l) �J  Substantive activity:2 This category involves real, material change to1
organizational goals, structures and processes, or in socially institution­
generallyalized practices. Society favors]   concrete, substantive responses 
(Ashforth &  Gibbs, 1990; 1995).Suchlnan,  
(2)� Symbolic activity:} This]  category does not involve real changes, but 
m
Yln
altempts compatible normstot n1  portray corporate activities as with0I11pati  societal rn1S 
values PfetTer, Managementand (Ashforth &  Gibbs, 1990; 1981,ff  28). nl  
generally favors syn1bolic sinceassurances)  they are more andeconol11ica]  
flexible than substantive actions. 
m , nom l 
rrhe J strategies2  are classified and defined below. Ashforth & Gibbs (1990) 
ofler an in-depth discussion on the three su andbstantive  first six syInbolicm  
emerged from empirical 
T 1
strategies. The Jast three symbolic strategies ln thenl  worknl  
incOIllpleted  this study.ompl t
Substantive Strategies 
(1) Role ThejJel:/orI11.once:  obviouslnost  atattelnpt  islegitill1ation  where theI � p rj'ormanc m m itim
organization adapts its goals, of111ethods  operation, itsand/or  output to 
conform performance members on 
metho l
tonl  the expectationsnl  of the ofIn n1  society 
whom it\V OlTI  depends for critical resources (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). This 
legitimacystrategy could be chosen in response to a gapln   resulting from 
actual failureperfonnance  by the organization (Lindblom, cited by Gray et 
a!., orI  performance are determined by 
rm
1995a, 54), where expectationsnl  
market, normative, legaln1 t  or political forces, and offulfihnent  theseln lm
expectations is essential for survival.
(2)�  isomorphism: This is legitimationCoercive aS0J110rphi rn  1110remor  subtle, evolutionary itin1  
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;3~ Meyer & 1977).Ro\van,  It isprocess \v w
manifested time, normsbynl  a blending, over ofn1  evolving societal andrn1S  values 
theinto an organizational structure, signaling willingness.   and ability of the 
conformorganization to to1' n1  society's collective values. The organization 
becomes substantively 'matched' with cultural byitsC0l11 S  environment,Ill t ln  
employing from symbolicsubstantivenl  strategies or by shifting oll1 strategiesS ll1b   to 
time. structurally legitimatesubstantive strategies over This.inl  .r t organizationitill1   
becomes an1  repository of pubJicl  confidence (Meyer &  Ro\van,w  1977; 
Suchman, 1995).ll1  
(3) practices: The 
anempt, through communication, toC0l111nUnicati   alter the societal definition of 
0 � Altering socially/i./t  institutionalizedrh)  ctice,s'  l~ organization could 
tt n1
legitimacy, so that the amended organization's'n1 definitionn1 lH.i   reflects the 
activities. This is the 1110Stmos  difficult strategy to implementsuccessfully nl nlc  
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). 
StrategiesSy/nbolic m
(I) � EspousingI   socially acceptable The organization Inaygoals:jJ  m  advocate 
may,socially acceptable goals while pursuing less acceptable ones. It for111a   
example, discloseI11pl  ethical policies, but fail to proceduresin1plell1ent m m  to 
monitor compliance.nl0 0111plian  
(2)� Denial and concealment: Thebn  organization I11ay denysinlply  or suppress 
aboutinforl11ation  activities that 111ay undernline legitiI11acy. 
ma  m
(3)� with symbols, The organization could 
rmati ma m itim  
Identification 'rvit valuesln  or institutions: 
toattenlpt  identifiedbeconle  with valuessynlbols,  or institutions av.;ith H m m m w  
strong, established base of (Dowlingsociallegitilnacy  &  Pfeffer, ]975).l legitim 1 . 
(4) Offering� accounts: The organization 111ayma  offer explanations, includingjj
excuses and justifications, designed to distance the organization fromnl 
situations adversely affecting its legitinlacy.m  
(5) Ojfering apologies:�Qfl ByLl]Jologi   apologizing, an may showorganization Ill  S0l11esom  
remorseexpression of forlTIO S   a negative event. 
(6) Ceren1.onial Certainconjorn-lity:  highly visible and salient practices that are� moni f rmi
consistent with social expectations be111ay  adopted,, while leaving thema  
structureforInal t t  of thet  organizationi ti  intact.i t t. For scapegoating,exalnple, ti , orm l m l , 
the offonnation  a task force to study the environnlental ofinlpacts rm m m
activities,, providernay  the appearance of action without the substance 
(Pfeffer,( f ff r, 1981).). 
m  
The nextt threet  strategiest t i  representt a new contributiont i ti  tot  thet  fran1ework,m , 
and resultedr lt  the[roln t  componentenlpirical t off thist i  study.t .fr m m iri l 
(7)� of may acknowledgeadmittingAdmission guilt:q  By guilt,nl  , an organizationi ti  111a  no\vl e 
least attemptat partialasL  responsibility for a negative event,t, ini  an totteln t t  diffuseiff se 
impression andlorthe situation by creating the nl  reality/  lit  off honesty.st . 
(8) l11.isinterpretation: may� Misrepresentation.... or;   open to mis nterpret : The organizationr i ti  111a  
or glve a falsel  impression orrintentionally unintentionally i  orilTIpr  r account,t, 
supply ambiguous infonnationrm t  that could be lTIisleadingmisl  orr opene  toto 
misinterpretation.n1   
(9) trivializing� The organizationr i ti  111aymAvoiding, or  skirting around the issue:i : 
offer a partial explanation, trivialize or fail to directlyi tl  addressr  an issue.iss e. l'lheT e 
infornlation notl11ay  be clearly conveyed or Illay besi111ply  inlplied.m m  m  im  im li . 
HYJ)othesis DeveLoJ)Jnentypot  velopm t 
One of the pri lnary vationslTIoti  that the conceptt of organizationali ti l legitinlacy 
has for 111anagelnentmanagem  is COn1111Unicationcommunicati  with society.i t . InI  thist is study,st , itit isis 
environmental isis partrt off thet e 
m mo  le itimacy 
hypothesized that disclosurenl  in annuall reportsr rt  
legitilnationm  process,, which is indicativeti  of thet  degreer e off 'fit'corporate 'fit \ 
betweent  societali t l expectationst ti  and organizationali ti l activitiesti iti  (Zenisek,( is , 1979).). Wee 
argue that,t t, ifi  an organizationi ti  voluntarilyl t il  disclosesi l  environn1enta] infonnationironm tal i f rmation 
ini  itsit  annuall report,t, thent  thist i  disclosurei l  isi  a orsyn1bolic r substantivet ti  strategicstrate icm li  
toattenlpt t  countert  perceivedi  existingi ti  or potentialt ti l challengesll  tot  itsits legitin1acy, 
arisingri i  from corporatefr n1 r r t  (industry-related(i tr -r l t  and/orl r company-specific) activitiesnl - ifi ) ti ities 
thet  environment. More specitlcaIly, anan 
tt m t legitim , 
affectingff ti  naturalt r l ir nn1 t. andifi ll ,  incorporatingi r r ti  
indirecti ir t ofnleasure f thelegitinlacy, t  researchr r  hypothesist i  is:i :m r  l itim , 
IfIf i.l hasc0l11pany has anan ofiten1 f voluntaryvoluntary disclosurecl1vironnlental disclosure inin itsits annualannual thenreport. thena company item cnvironmental rcport. 
thisthis isis aa strategylegitin1atiol1 strategy tollsed to respondrespond toto recordedrecorded societalsocietal andnOrl11S and valuesvalues and/orand/orlegitimation used norms 
legitinlllcy arisinggapts) arising adversefroll) adverse newsne s Inedia targetingreports targeting the C0111pany and/or 
thethe industryindustry inin whichhich itit operates.operates. 
legitimacy gap(s) from media re[lOrlS thc company <md/or 
IfIf aa con1pany to\vishes to extendextend oror its111aintain its vialegilin1acy via itsits annualannual report,report,company wishes maintain legitimacy 
itit willill respondrespond toto societalsocietal andnOrI11S and valuesvalues only.only. IfIf itit wishesishes toto defenddefend itsitsnorms 
itlegitilllacy, it respondwi]J respond toto actualactual gap(s)legiti111acy gap(s) oror toto combinationa co bination ofoflegitimacy, iJl legitimacy a 
societ.al andnornlS and valuesvalues andand gaps.legitirnacy gaps.societal norms legitimacy 
Beforeefore focusingfocusing onon researchresearch thatthat toatten1pts to explainexplain oror thepredicl the useuse ofof anyanyattempts predict 
specificspecific strategy,legiti111ation strategy, itit isis essentialessential toto firstfirst provideprovide supportelnpirical support 
forfor thethe hypothesishypothesis thatthat corporatecorporate atten1ptsattempts atat legitimation are indeedindeed 
legitimation empirical 
legitilnation theare the 
underlyingunderlying causecause forfor voluntaryvoluntary disclosure.envirol1111ental disclosure. ThatThat isis thethe purposepurpose ofof 
thisthis study.study. 
environmental 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This explanatory study exal11inesami  the forces underlying voluntary environ­
mental multi-casedisclosure111enta  in annual reports. Yin's (1989) research111ulti-c   designi  isi  
tollsed  investigate the hypothesis. bookI-lis  has abecoll1e  standard reference 
case study research design (Colbert & Spicer. 1995). Consistentt with 
u H  com  
for , \\.,Iit  
Colbert & Spicer (1995, 430), \\.JCwe believe that Yin provides the clearestle r  and 
approachn10st  multi-casemo coherent and cOlllprehensiveompre  to explanatoryI11ulti-  t  
research. 
The objectiveprin1ary m of Yin 's~ approach is TO provide anu/wical ('\'idencel  hl oJ7olyri o! e\'i  
about the en1.pirical validit.v the0.1'  underlying byIheor.v,  casernatching  
evidence back to theory, and not to generaliz.eraliz  fronlm a san1plem  to a larger 
1989,21). template with 
mpiri li ity / t ry  m  
population (Yin, , The  pre-specified theory is "used as a n1  \\l  
which to theconlpare  resultsen1pirical  of the case study" (Yin, 1989, 38).. ItItm m i
\~/hichneeds to state the conditions under a particular phenolnenon rcorporatewhich m  [ t  
envirol1111ental reporting will1  generally be found anl"\vhen  extant or possiblei lironment ] w  
future gaplegitinlacy  is perceived] and the conditions itV\lhen  is not likely totm wh  
be found I\vhen no existing or possible future gap is perceived] (Yin,i , j 54).989, . 
etfect to be 
198 , 
This characteristic has a profound onf  the selection of the cases 
investigated, arewhIch  chosen specifically because they exhibit identifiedS0I11e i i  
not by llleansm  of a sampling method 
i som  
general theoretical principle, and n1  that111eth  t  
ensures no bias. 
Following Yin (1989), the researcher seeks "to~'to specify necessarythe 
a of theoreticaJ1y-signl/icaJ11 elenlents,~'conditions among setnl  retically-sign ficant l ments," and isi  nott 
satisfied mostwith1  explanations for of1110 1  the variance in the data, but seeks tot  
explain all the data. Deviant cases are used thetasll  opportunities to refine 
analysis so that the relationships described "have been analytically induced 
from theOID  data" (Silvern1an,rm , 1989,, 62-63).. If thet  ofoulcon1e  a case is notttcom  as 
predicted, must manner,~ modi fledthet  theoryt  benl t  1110di (Yin,n  i , 1989,, 54).). In thist i  theory111ann r, t r  
takesdevelopInent  place. Consistent with this, the findingsenlpirical  in thist im  m  
study resulted in an extension to the theory,, in the offornl  three neVi syrnbolicm ew m  
(~rstrategies.legitinlation t t i . These were (1) (f{bnission guilt,ilt, (2) /l1isrepresenlolion 
lO misinterpretation, avoiding, trivializing, or aroundskirring  
l itim ti  I  admi i  0/ misrepresentLl! i  
or open !  andlni i t retatiol1,  (3)( ) ich , r i i li i , i ti  
Ihe issue.t  i . 
Selectionl ti  Casesq{ s s and DOCUIJ1ents0/ ocume ts 
Two off Canada's's largestl r st wood productsr ts wereconlpanies r  investigatedi sti t  overr am i s 
five-yearfi - r periodri  to(199] t  1995).). Additionaliti l casess s wouldl  be helpful,l f l, butt thet( 1 
'~snlall sizesanlple si  off cases"s s"researcherr s r r shoulds l  avoidi  thinkingt i i  ini  ofternlS f thet  t rms "sm ll s m l  
(1989, 38-39), as from a tosalnple  a 
larger population, but to provide analytical evidence about the empirical 
Yin ] thel  intention is not to generalize n1 m
1995).validity of the theory (Colbert &  Spicer, ]  
o( Consistent with previous empirical findings on CSDSelection Companies..f  
practices and their relevance to legitimacy theory (Savage, 1998), two 
parameters:corporations were selected within the following n1  
(I) � minimizeJ Canadian-owned, with annual reports issued in Canada, to thenl rn   
normseffects of differences in international societal andnn   values. 
(2) Publicly conspicuous, due to their size. 
(3) In are� an industry where environmental inlpactsm  central and pervasive 
features economic companiesofl  organizational activity.nl  Resource-based 01l1pani  
impact environmentgenerally have a significant onln  the natural andnl   have the 
likelihood mediagreatest ofI  receiving adverse news coverage.ln   Using 
companies fromOlllpa i resource-basedan1  industries is consistent with prior environ­
mental 1994,85; Freedman,reporting111enta  research (Buhr, , Buhr & 1996).n1   
companies (1) Canadian-ownedTherefore, the selected were:Olllpa i  ] and\v   listed on the 
Toronto companiesStock'Tor  Exchange, (2) the largest inOln   their industry, based on 
revenue,~ companies1994 operating and (3) resource-based. Two innl   Canada's 
pulp and paper industry were selected. They were MacMillan Bloedel Ltd 
(MB) Domtare  and Inc.Olnt   This resource-based industry was chosen because: 
(I) � widely as\v l environnlentalm  problemsIt  is recognised having significant blelTI  
(Adarns, 1992~ Foot, 1996; &Freedlnan  Jaggi, ] Wiseman,988;  1982).m ; m 1
most environmental(2) Internationally, this industry is the prolificIn  discloser of irol1tll  
information iv;~ Fekrat et aI., 1996; Niskala & Pretes~ 1995;(Buhr,nn  1994, ret s, 
Economic 1992).United Nations andln  Social Council ]  
(3)� According to a report in the Winnipeg FreeH1in i  Press (June 6~ AS),, 1993, p. 8  
entitled 'ForestryLitl  industries top poll's watch-closely list', Canada's pulp 
and paper industry continues to hold the distinction of the industry that 
people want togovernn1ents  keep the watchcl<?sest  on. This is consistentm ose
other\vith  ]991, and]992  1993 poll results. 
(4)� As Canada's largest industry, pulp and paper has long been the backbone 
w 1 1
of its TheeCOnOJll)'.  industry's contribution to Canada's trade balance isco omy
larger than the contributionscon1bined  of the 111ining, fisheries,petroleUl11,  
and agriculture industries (Gordon, 1997; Orton, 1991; Rusk, 1992; 
m i minin troleum  
~ ~
Sherbanowski, 1991).r \v i  
of News Mpdia Reports.e  English newspaper reports about theSelection q{ l1/
actionsenvironn1ental  of the forcOlllpanies  the] to991  j fiscal995  years were 
from the Canadian Business and CUtTentI  Affairs (CBCA) database 
m ompa e 1 1
selected 0l11
employees(1996). Articles or press releases not originated by ofrn   the selected 
companies used,0111pani  the was\v  exarnine legitimacywere as intention to m public tin1  
challenges,~ companies' newsand not the responsen1  to these challenges via the vv'  
media. performedThen1e  news report selection process was byrn1   a graduate research 
compared.assistant, replicated by the principal researcher, and the results Oln  
Proceduresf(Jr Dataf()   Collection and Analysis 
The general analytic strategy was the use legitimacyof theorytin1   to explain 
environmentalcorporate disclosure.nl   
collection. The data collection technique was document\~/as analysis.n1   DataData .. 
(I) environmentalfor the 1991 to 1995 fiscal years consisted of: 1 disclosurenl   in 
companies environmentalthe annual reports of the and0l11pani  in reportsn1   referred to in 
environmental normsthe annual reports; (2) recorded Canadian nl andrn1S  values; and 
media, implied(3) events reported in the news whichlTIedi  negativelll   industry-related 
company-specific environmentaland Olnpa - actions.nl   The data collection proceeded as 
follows. 
(1) MB, DomtarStep 1. For I  (2)l\t1  andnl   (3) the pulp and paper industry, separate 
media were prepared,chronological descriptive lists of adverse news reports111edi  
using the CBCA database as a source of reference. The lists were used as a 
source for collecting copies of the actual reports. Copies of the reports were 
summarize legitimacyused to identify and actualSUlTIlnari  or perceived gaps,nl   over the 
From 164 mediafive-year period. thenl  analysis of the content of ] adverse reportsI11edi   
asnanle  the perpetrator damagingin which MB was mentioned byn1enti  m of nl  
environmental legitimacy were Domtar,acts,ln  63 gapsnl  distilled.\v  For 4400n1   adverse 
media 34 legitimacy gaps.tin1  For the industry, 145 newsreportsnl  gave rise to 
legitimacy examples somereports resulted in 48 gaps.tin1  (Appendix C gives ofnl  orS0l11   
the MB gaps). 
Step 2. normsA listing of Canadian societal andBann   values, as they related to 
environment, documentedprotection of the natural wasnl  prepared. These were lun  
(I) (i.e. environmental literature,by polling1  experts Gallop Poll), (2) the n1 1 and  (3) 
major governmentas evidenced by 111ajo initiatives.r n1  4 
company, all environmental disclosures the annualStep 3. For each Oln innl  
environmentalreports, and in separate reportsnl   referred to in the annual reports, 
measured,were identified, andI11easur   recorded, by fiscal year, using content analysis 
1994,98-110; a!.,(see Buhr, 4, Gray et 1995a,I   1995b). The categories listed in 
supplementedAppendix A were used. These were by] n1   subcategories to refine 
the analysis. The coding proceeded as follows: Annual reports were read in 
informationtheir entirety and each unique piece of wasnl   coded by a graduate 
research assistant on a document by document basis.n1  This process was 
1I1 accordance with Buhrconducted specificIn  coding guidelines, devised by 
(1994, 346-348), and adapted for this study. These guidelines appear in 
Appendix B. Completed worksheets distinguished between voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure, mandatory111andator according1  to Canadian GAAP, so that 111andat  
disclosure could be excluded. The procedure was independently replicated by 
the principal researcherr,l compared.and the results rn  
The commonpurpose'  of this step was threefold. First, a languageC01111110n  of cross­
case was generated (Miles, 1979), forconcepts ] providing the structure 
comparisons. environmentalcross-case Second,Olnpari  it ensured that all voluntary nl  
examined legitimacydisclosure was inrn  the context of theory,ln   as opposed to an 
examination environmentalofnl  only the datanlc   that fit the theory. Third, the coding 
was  independently repl icated, and the completeness andOlnpl t  reliability of the 
results were enhanced. 
Step 4. Using the coding worksheets as a reference, each item ofrn  
environmental comprehensively described.�disclosurenlent::d  was 0I11prehensi  
Dow All items oftelTIS  voluntary disclosureenvirOllrnental  were Inatchedm �analysis:!J la  ronm  
with legitimation analysing�were specific\v  strategies.in1  Three techniques usedvv'cr   for  
evidence:�the  
(1) Pattern-lnatching: isenlpirical  comparedI � m An m pattern withOln   a predicted 
pattern, following the theoretical propositions of the framework. Innlev./  
explanatory studies, the patterns may beIn  related to the dependent [i.e. 
environmental disclosuresnl  in the formrn1 legitimation strategiesJ] andof nl
norms mediaindependent [i.e. recorded societal andnl1S  values, adverse news 111edi  
legitimacy gaps] coincide,~reports and nlu variables.J  If the patterns the internal 
validity of  the study is strengthened (Yin,i ~ 1989, 108-109).
(2)� used primarilyExplanation-building: This is ll fornl   explanatory case studies. 
The  objective is to build a general explanation that fits each of the 
individual cases, even though the details of the individual cases may vary 
1989, 113-114).(Yin, I  14)  
(3) analysis:'rinle-series  There are different types of analysestinle-series  (Yin,� T m m
'chronologies'1989, 115-120). The type called best·   suits this study. The 
compare withanalytical objective is to theOln  chronology that\v   predicted by 
some legitimacy whereexplanatorySOlll  theory [i.e. theory],nl  the\v   theory has 
specified that eventsson1e  111 alwayslist  occur before other events [i.e. an 
occurIllust  before environmental 
m mu
extant or  perceived legitimacy gapiriIl1  m nl
place), withdisclosure  takes ] the\v   reverse sequence not being an option. 
withConsistent  the analytical techniques, the operational procedure for the 
data  analysis of each wascornpany  to the'pattern-111atch'  content of each iten1 
of  environmental disclosurenlc  with the content of adverse Inediam  reports 
m ttern-mat em 
From specifIcpreceding issuance of the annual report. thisn)  detailed analysis,, i  
examples fromlegitimation strategies could be identified. (Appendix C gives an1  ron1 
a]] environmental panern-matchedthe MB case.) If J disclosuren1  could be to-In   a 
legitimation manner, wouldstrategyin1  in this the111anne  hypothesis bevv   supported.. 
The initial case \vasw  MB. The findings were againstc0111pared t thet1  ompa  
hypothesis, using the explanation-building technique. Consistent with thetpothesi ~ \\l  
methodology, was i:lresearch thenl  second case analysed\v   independently.. Then,, a 
comparison was conducted, which was the final stage of thetcross-case n1 \v  
replication process. The objective was to draw cross-case conclusions thefroIll tr m 
results of the individual cases. However, this of111anner  presentation resulted inimann  
a lengthy, repetitious discussion of results. Thus, consistent the\vith  approach 
adopted by Colbert & Spicer (1995, 443-444), the evidence and findings for 
both cases have been presented in a single section. 
w  
Reliabilitv and Validjt)!
. 
li ity
. 
There are reliabilitytw'o  issues: reliability in the collection of the dOCUl11ents 
news media government 
ocume  
(i.e. annual reports, reportsJn  and publications),rnn1  , and 
reliability in the analysis of each (recalldOCUI11ent  that the data collectiontiocume  
technique is analysis).dOCUIl1ent  The extraction of the reports111edia  thefron1 t  
database was done by the graduate research assistant, and replicated by thet  
government problen1r blem as they 
ocume  medi  rom 
principal researcher. The reportsnl  presented no 
were available upon request. No reliability wereproblen1s  encountered in Stepstlem  
I and 3 of the data collection procedures, as the lists of events and the SU111nlary 
Canadian performance expectations~ectati s, andnOrl115  values were purelyl  
summa  
of rn1  orms 
descriptive. This was merely of subjectivetiaI11ere   recording procedure, devoid 
anddecision-nlaking  researcher bias. 
For analyzing each annual report~rt, 
m
the disclosure categories (Appendixi  A) 
n1anner~were used ini  a standardized so that any researcher would categorizeim er, 
(code) the data in the waysanle  1993,(Silvernlan, , The147-(48).  coding wasm  m , 1
done independentlyi tl  by twot  people,l , and thet  resultsr lt  conlpared.m r . 
Also,, an evidentiary base was so111aintained,  that the supporting dOCLllllenla­maintain , ocum t
tionti  leadingl i  tot  thet  case conclusionsl i  (annuall reports,t , databaset  printouts,i t t , nlediam i  
reports,r rt , reports,governlnent r rt , codingi  detailedvv'orksheets, t il  analyses)l ) wouldl  ber m t worksh t , 
availableil l  for inspection.i ti . To furthert  increasei  reliability,li ilit , specifici i  weredocun1en1.s  
citedit  ini  thet  workingr i  papers,r , so that 
cument  
thet aL t  evidentiaryi ti r  base,, upon inspection,i ti , 
wouldl  revealr l thet  evidencei  (Yin,( i , 1989,, 98-103). 
Construct,str t, internali t r l and externalt r l validityli it  issuesiss s were 
- ( ). 
alsovv'ere ls  addressed.r ss . 
Constructtr t validityli it  was achievedi  by followingf ll i  specifiedifi  datat  collectionJI ti  
procedures,r r s, preparingr ri  worksheetsr s ts detailingt ili  thet  resultsr s lts off thet  datat  collectionll ti  
and analysis, and cross-referencing (i.e. Yin 's~ chain of evidence). Internal
validity was addressed by using explanation-building,pattern-Inatching,  andm
time-series multi-caseanalysisIll  techniques. External validity is implicit in the I11ulti-  
method,study whereIn   replication logic is used. 
Table I summarizes coJJection and] theUln  stages of data andlle t  data analysis, 
shows how the reliability and validity issues were addressed. 
CASE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS 
oj" CasesDescription .l a:'J'e  
MB, Canada's largest pulp and paper products company, withOln   12886 
employees, salesnl  in excess of $5 billion, and total operating assets of $4.6 
Table Reliability and Validity of Data Collection and Analysis1.1  
Method Reliability/Validity� l  
For Data Collection: 
Collect adverse news 111ediamedi  reports. Prepare a chronological, compareReplicate and C0l11p  
descriptive list thefor  industry and each case.I'm reslllts~sults; documentaryOCUI11enta  
database. 
Fr0l11 Inedia identifyreports,  and list andc0l11pany-specific  media 
legitimacy reports. 
rom m . ompany-sp Cross-reference to 111cdi  
industry-specific gaps.nl  
values.Calcgorize andnonl1S   
database. 
te rms � Maintain evidentiary 
disclosureCategorize  on coding worksheet. Measure and describe.ril � compareReplicate and C0l11p  
results. 
For Data Analysis: 
each1:::or  ofilenl  identifydisclosure,  at least one Cross-referencing;legitil11ation  
strategy, by matching disclosure (the dependent variable) with: Documents 
Fo t m . itim  
cited;OCUIllc   
Evidentiary database; 
( I) ofcalegories  Canadian andnonns  values (an independent Pattern-matching; 
variable) Explanation-building; 
I  t m!11S r  
J   
analysis;Titne-series  
1I/1(l/or Replication logic. 
m
(JJ d  
(2) gapes)legitinlacy  (an independent variable)..\  m  
----------_._--------------­
billion for the 1995 fiscal year,ar~ managed two n1il1ionmilli  hectares of productivenl  t\\'O 
timberlands, approximately which Columbia. MBn1berl halfin1  of were\v  in British nl isf\1   
Montreallisted on NASDAQ and the Toronto, andT\1ontr   Vancouver stock exchanges 
(MB Annual Report, 1995; MB Annual Statutory Report, 1991). 
major American manufacturer packaging,Domtar, a Northn1aj  n1er ofI11anufact   pulp, paper, \ 
lumber, throughout firstand withUl11ber  facilities situated Canadall  and the U.S., ranks l  
among lumber with employees,nl0 producersn1  in Eastern Canada, 9503\v  annualrn  
sales of  $2.8 billion and total assets of $3.2 billion for the 1995 financial year.
Domtar is listed the Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver stock exchangeson0l11t r
(1994 and 1995 Annual Reports).
Tesr of Hyporhesist ql t  
environmentalDetailed, descriptive analyses of the disclosuresn1   contained in the 
to MB Domtar demonstrate1991 1995 annual reports of both andtvl   nl thatrn   the 
findings were consistent with the hypothesis for each individual item ofnl  
disclosure.environn1ental  Each ofitenl  disclosure in the annual reports of eachm m
company matched norms legitimacywasOll1pa  with1l1atc  categories of andrll1S  values and/or inl  
resultant legitimationgaps, and the strategiesllegitinul   were identified. 
Major legitiJnocy problenlsrima m  
MacMillan Bloedel. Throughout the five-year period, MB experienced attacks 
on its Forlegililnacy.  1993 through 1995, it received direct1110re  adverse newst m mor
coverage than the industry (in ofternlS  ofnUlllber  industry-related adverse 
news reports\v  see-  Table 2), despite the industry's reputation as the 
ms um  
)~ worst
offenderenvironn1ental  in Canada.m
MB's  adverse reports111edia  resulted in the identification of 63 C0l11pany­medi compan
specific gapslegitinlacy  over the five-year period, versus 48 industry-relatedm
ofNun1ber  Adverse Media ReportsTable 2. m
Fiscal  Year MB IndustryD0l11tar omt  
---------------------~------------~.__._----­
1991 17 27 32 
1992 20 10]  40 
1993 50 3 36 
1994 41 2 27 
1995 36 2 10 
Total:t l: 164 44 145 
---------­
 main legitimacy problems, fromgaps. MB's 111ai itilTI derivedblelTIS  ther0I11  content of adverse 
media reports,111edi  were: 
(l) � image1 The decline of its public andnl   its perceived lack of concern for the 
environment (criticism measured terms numbernl nl - inI11easur  ofnn  ofUln   adverse reports 
- 1993);93)~peaked in 
(2)� number environmentalcriminalA large ofnl  convictionsJll   for illegal activitiesnl   
(criticism 1995);95)~beganlll  in 1993 and peaked in I
(3) COIUl11bia� lts destructive,I  unsustainable forestry practices in British olumbi  
(criticism damage salmonpeakedlll  in 1993), and the resultant tonl  andhn   other 
marine habitats criticismlifenl  (withl  atiticis111  its worst in 1993/94); 
(4) � Its unwillingness to change unfriendlyenvironnlentally m processes and 
(criticismpractices peakediticisIl1  in 1993); 
(5) � lts association with the Clayoquot Sound controversy. Public protests 
remainingagainst MB's logging activities, in one of the world's largest nl  
temperatetracks of rainforest,nl   resulted in 932 arrests. This was the largest 
massact of civil disobedience in Canadian history, resulting in the largest I1la  
trial in the history of the w.estern world. Protesters were withcharged \v  
criminal contemptnl J oft n1   court for defying a MB-induced injunction banning 
demonstrations onnl  company work sites. The resulting reports111edia OI11pa  medi
most legitimacy. clairnedrepresented the severet11051  attack on MB's Theynl  thatilTl   
MB was responsible for harassment andtn  attempted ofintitnidation nl m
lO,OOO camp (MacJsaacprotesters. Over ] supporters0,000  visited the protesters' nl I  
Champagne, damaging criticism,&  1994).n1  MB suffered severe and public111agi   itici5111  
especially in 1993;3~
(6)� The MBClayoquot'  Sound events led to boycotts and threats of boycotts of IVI  
products, which could adversely and 111ateriallymaterial  affect the company'sC0l11pa ~
linancial condition,f  earnings, liquidity and even its survival (attacks peaked 
during 1994/95); and 
(7)� major ] 994A chlorinen1aj  dioxide spill at MB's Powell River plant in caused1   
(criticism 1994).extensive, deadly air and water pollution peakedln  in ]  
Primarilyi In  asI   a result of (5) and (6) above, MB appeared to be in the throes of 
major legitimacy samea t11aj  crisis;tin1  the industry was in the position.In   As the 
dominant firm in the industry, MB contributed to this negative publicnl l nn
a profound 111anner.man er  criticismperception in Media ofnl  the industry and MB 
same legitimacyfrequently appeared in the report.nl  Major industry gapstin1   were: 
(1)� mill efj~uent,Water and air pollution, caused by pulp 111i11 poisoningfl t,  fish and 
human millsendangering health.U111a   Pulp were11lill   accused of discharging highly 
fromtoxic dioxins and furans, theirnl  chlorine-bleaching process, into the 
 environment. demanding (criticismMarketsnl  began chlorine-freeln  products nl 
1991/92);1/ 2)~peaked during 
(2) � A deterioration of reputation due to a perceived lack of concern for the 
environnlentm  (criticlSl1lriticism peaked in 1991, but remained strong throughnl   
1993);: 
(3) An� unwillingness to environmentallychange unfriendlynl   processes and 
mills (criticism 1992);92)~practices, especially at pulp 111i l peakedln  in 
(4) Destructive, unsustainable practices, yespecial]  re tolating  [-'orest nlanage­i ll ror  m
ment Columbia (criticismin111cn  British OIUl11bi  peakedi rn  in 1993). Poor logging and 
practicesclear-cutting  destroyed forest andecosystenls  danlaged SalI11011,ll m m s lmon  
marine wildlife (criticism 1993);other life,rn  bird and habitats\v  peakedti islll  in : 
The(5) �  threat of an international boycott of Canadian forest products in 
(criticism wasretaliation for the industry's destructive logging practices nl \v  
pronounced1110sL  in 1994). 
DomtLll: worstD0l11tar's  year was 1991, 27\vith omtar  w 'bad reportsnevvs'  (seew  T'able 
mo t
Onlf( I  
contamination There was2). Most of these related to land atrn  old plant sites. '  a\v   
significant decline, to 10 reports, in 1992;92~ ror \993:a further decline to three f  1  
and for 1994 and ] adverse995,  cOIl1pany-specific reportsI1ledia  stabilized at1 ompany-spe  me  
only two reports respectively. The ofnun1ber  reportsindusLry-related  rar 
those targeting Domtar directly. Therefore, the industry was 
m  str  
exceeded 0l11t \v
experiencing ofn10re  a legitil11acy thanproblen1  DOl1ltar. Donltar-specific ~bad
news' reports resulted in legiitimacy gaps,ln  vs. 48 
mo  itim  lem omt  m il 'b  
the identification of 34 VS  
industry gaps. Donltar's 111ain were:problenls m mai m
Toxic(1) itsor  old wood­I �  land contanlinationm  left behind at a nunlberm  f cl
preserving plants, and its apparent inability to restore these sites (the 
Domtar legitimacy originating insubject of 26 of the 34 nl gaps,itin1  with 21 
1991);91)~ and
(2) Air and water pollution caused by its pulp (sixl1lills  gaps, fr0l11 ] 991, ]993� mi  rom 1 , 1  
and 1994). 
Don1tar's concernI11ajor  its\vas  inability to rell1edyCross-case c0J11parisoJ1.ompa son  mt maj  w  m  
toxic land despitecontan1ination,  clean-upgovernnlenl  orders and threats ofmi m t
legal action. Attacks on its thoughlegitin1acy,  bitter, originated thefron1  
c0111rnunities froBl government 
itim rom 
ommuniti  in which the old plants were situated, and m nl
for contamination damaged cOlllpany'sdenlandsm  renlediation.m  The site ln thenl  om '  
reputation, but  did not condemnation,provoke international unliken1   the MB 
Clayoquot Sound controversy. A seriousnlore  threat to wasDOHltar  the call for 
an international boycott of Canadian forest products, due to the industry's'  
Domlar was the subject of adverse 
m omt  
destructive logging practices. itselfOTI t   not 
reporting111edia  in this regard.medi
problems serious Domtar's,Generally, MB's legitimacy wereln  far more thanioLl   0111tar' , 
based on the number of ad newsverse  reports, and \videspread ofcondenlnation  
MB's environmental'5  actions. In particular, MB experienced a self-inflictedi li t  
legitimacy 'crisis' (Clayoquot Sound), as Domtar's 
w  m  
opposed to self-inflicted0l11t  i li t  
'problem'Jegitilnacy  (site Incontanlination).  contrast to MB, seriousDOH1tar's il m m omta  
concern,]egitinlacy  i.e. the call for an international ofboycott  Canadian forestt 
products, Theindustry-illlposed.  difference in 
l m ll 
was m intensity thesebet\veen ttw  
somethreats will be used to explain ofSOln   the variations in the results of thisi  study.t . 
In this regard, Laughlin (1991) would argue that MB was subjected to nluchm  
larger exogenous shocks than 00111t41r.Domta  
Another difference was that MB's Blain legitin1acy threal not\vas  subjectj t tot  
mandatory requirelnents,m  CanadianDon1tar's i  
m  itim  t w  
GAAP111andato  disclosure while m  was.. 
GAAP requires that future site restoration costs be recognized as a liabilityilit  ini  
financial staten1cnts.me  
Both addressedcon1panies  all Inajor gapslegitinlacy  and(coIllpany-specific  
industry-related) in their annual reports. 
m m m m  
Patterns Reportso.fMedia  Disclosures{[nd / al1
MacMillan Bloedel (Fig. I). specifically targetingi  MB,,Adverse1  reports, 
increased in 1992,, peaked in 1993,, and declined for both 1994 and 1995.. 
Adverse industry reports followed a pattern,silnilar  but with a one-year pre­m
lag.elnptive l . For thet  post-1991t  period,i , a patterntt  elnerges.m ti  m . 
reactedMJ3 t  sharplyr l  ini  itsit  annuall especiallyrepo11s, i ll  1993fronl  throught r  1995,,B 0l , m 
when thet  ofnUI11ber  MB-specific- ifi  adverser  reportsl11edia r rt  exceeded thoset  forf r thetumb r me i  
industry.i t . alsoME l  introducedi t  itsit  separate11rst t  reportenvironnlental t ini  1993 andB lir t i m t l 
adevoted  significanti ifi t ofanlount  space tot  disclosure,environnlental i l , escalatingl tielevat  m t i m t l 
7190/0 fronl ) (2.29992 ( .  pages)) tot  1993 (18.76( .  pages).). InI  1994,, botht  MB­­9% fr m 1  
speci1~ic adverser  reports111edia r rt  and disclosurei l r  startedt rt  tot  decline.li . Thisi  trendtrecific medi  
continuedti  throught r  1995.. 
theoryLegitin1acy t r  providesr i  an explanationl ti  forf r theset  trends.tr . The directl1l0re ir t 
thet  adverser  publicli  reactionr ti  tot  itsit  environmentalir t l activities,ti iti , more MB 
itim  mor  
thet  1110r  
attempted tott n1 t  t  defendf  itsits extantt t legitimacy, ini  a reactiver ti  responser s s  tot  itsl itill1i:l , its 
crisis.legitinlacy ri i . The industry-relatedi tr -r l t  wascriticisl11  lessl  directir t and lessl  urgent,r t,l itim  riticism 
hence thet  lagtilne l  ini  responseNIB's r s s  tot  industry-relatedi str -r l t  gaps.s. Figurei r  suggests1 s ststim  M 's I 
thatt at thet e quantitya tit  off MB ~s disclosureiscl s re wasas positivelysiti el  relatedrelate  tot  thet e ofnUI11ber f's umber 
adverseadverse reports,111edia re rts, forf r botht  andc0l11pany-speciflc a  industry-relatedi str -relate  reports.re rts.media company-s ecific 
Domtar Thehe Domtar chartchart presentspresents aa veryvery differentdifferent factfact pattern.pattern.(Fig.[)OJJ1far ( i . 2).2). 00111t£1r 
Industry-relatedI str -relate  exceededcriticisI11 e cee e  cOlllpany-specific throughoutcriticisITI t r t thet ecriticism compa -s ecific criticism 
five-year period. The latler peaked in 1992. whereas adverse mediai  reportst  
targeting Domtar peaked in 1991. andL  then declined each year untiltil 199.+/95,[ 4/95. 
when the number stabilized onlyat  adverse(Wo  reports per year. 
Domtar's lowest level of disclosure was in 1991 th \ hich 
l O 
. yeare  in thew i  t  
reports. sitnumber of company-sp- ecificcill  media , dealingi  primarily withit  te 
contamination, wa' reo uiled from. thes  highest. Mandatory GAAP disclo 'ure'  s lt this1'1'0111 t i  
site contamination matter. Domlar's levelhighest  of disclosure was in 1995.. thet e 
ofwhIch  both company-specific 
t r"  t 
year in i the quantity industry-relaled t t  and li  
Domlar. wa,reports were lowest. For norn  discernible pattern observeds  between 
disclosure and adverse media reports.
Cross-case comparison. MB. in the throes of a legitimacy crisis.i . reacted far
c  
more intensely than Domtar to the number of adverse mediai  repol1s. hyreport . b  
increasing the quantity itsor  environmental disclosure andsubstantially.  Ihenf , t  
30 
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o 
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D No.. of Company Mediai  Reports 
No.. of IndustryI  Mediai  Reports 
II No.. off Pages off Disclosurei l  
I.Fig.i . I. MB:: Patternstt r s off andReportsrts  Disclosures.is l sure,. 
de TeaSingcr s  it slowly as the fuss waned. When comparing their worst years 
(1993 for MB vs. 1991 for Domtar), MB received 85% more adverse press 
Domtar.coverage than a /'  
it,In voluntarys  disclosure, MB reacted to its own problems, which 
ev n exceeded, the major industry-related legitimacyoverlapped with, and e
problems. For Domtar, industry-related media attacks exceeded company­
. pecinc attack.s ifi throughouts  the period. Its responses were directed toward these 
attacks. di closureindustry-related ItsH  voluntary environmental doess   not appear 
to be10  positively related to company-specific adverse media reports. 
Industry legitimacy problems were imposed on individual companies. For 
threat. of aJJ productsexample, ofs  an international boycott f' Canadianll  forest 
be ausc e o(f perceived unsustainable industry logging practices affected Domtar. 
Domlar's disclosure.This explains focust  on industry-related problems in its . 
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 RespoJlse {() Socieral Norms and Vall/f:'s/ 10   ll/ ll \l ille 
MacMillallillaJ  (Fig.Blued,,1 lo del 3). J. \118 mo ed progreso ivelyI'yJB v towardressi   responding 10 an 
increasing number of categories of socielal.  t:-ll norms and values. As Fi)..:.~~ 3 
suggests. anddemands  expectationst· MB was 'coerced' by societal  intot:Xpect t   
i omorphic timebecoming more overs  . 
DOlnlar (Fig. 4). Domtar was more ul1Jformllf  (1992 through 1995) in itsI 1!Cl l ~
thusvalues.  lessreqUiring  sO'letal coercionresponse to societal norms and , l  o o 
an II1creasedncre  slatet  of Allisomorphism,  categories ofr disclosure  nottoward t' .
to related to the lcaitlillacy problem. WO(\l!responded company's biggest eg im h wood 
preservative andeffluents  contaminated siles,A t . 
Further investigation revealed siteIhal  restoration wereissues  dealt with int t  '
reports, by anadian GAAP.the mandatory sections of the annual as.  required h C , 
/ 
10 / 
88 "f" 
6 
4 
2 
o0 I I I I I 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
D CategoriesMax. Norms & Values  
IIII ToNo. of Categories Responded  
FiR. J, \{~aclionsMB: Norms10  and Values.lueg . Rea tion  to
Therefore, this issue was not ignored by Domtar. Mandatory disclosure is 
heyondb  Ihet  scope of study,Ihis  as the voluntarY 
. 
t  purposeI  is to explain t ry
ufenvironmental disclosure. But, for comparability purposes, the calculations o  
reo ponse ratess werec   amended to include this mandatory disclosure. The 1993 
rat ro eresponse e froms   71 % to 86%, and 1994 and 1995 rates both rose from 
83% to norms100%. Overall, Domtar responded to the majority of the andOt-   
values categories on a consistent basis over time, suggesting a high levell of 
isomorphism..  
eross- 'use MB toward improved ratecomparison.Cm c  progressed an response 
the period.live-year  moreduring f Domtar was generally consistent in its 
response to societal norms and throughoLltvalues theghou   period, with a better 
overall response to categories of norms and values. 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
D Max. Norms & Values Categories � 
ToII No. of Categories Responded � 
4.FiR. . ReactionsDorntar:  to Norms and Values.g. m  
 RespolISl? to MediaAr!l'erSI?  Reports. Ollse f c!J'erse
MacMillan Bloedel (Fig. 5). The results support the prevalence of the annuall 
report as a corporate vehicle.communications  Annual reports were extensively 
used to respond to adverse media report. 
. 
. fors  both industry-related and 
is ues. This was particularly true for 1993,company-specific s when\99 .  the 
response was 97O/i. industry company-specific100% rate to7%  reportsu'  and OO~ to 
reports. On average, MB responded to 88% of the adverse media reports over 
the five-year period. 
Domlar (Fig.t  6). chan useThis alsort  provides evidence of prevalentl t of the 
annual report for corporate communications. For Domlar, thet .  percentaget  
response rate was particularly high for industry-related news withreports.  an 
average response rate of 90%. For company-re1<ltedany-rela  reports, the average 
rates 1991, 81 Y(l and 
.' ,
response rate was 75%. The forl  Domtar's worst year, were\99 ,  \ (1/(1 
74%, respectively. The number of company-specific reports dwindled each 
year, from a high of 27 in 1991 to two in 1995. Although Domtar did not 
include a response to the two company-specific media reports in its 1995 
voluntary environmental thedisclosure,  issue was addressed in its mandatory.
disclosure. reports]ndustry-relalcd  also decreased 1993from  through 1995.I te lll 
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Fig. 6.tJ  R~ports.Domtar: Response  to Current Year Adverse Media c'port  
Cross-case comparison.. While MB had a high response to both industry and(' ,l u urison
company-relatedl'() pan - c  reports, Domtar's focus was on th~e industry. The high 
industry response rates were comparable (88% overall  for MB vs. 9Wlr(Y;, for 
Domtar).l)ol11la  This is intuitively appealing, as a boycott of Canadian products would 
adver.ehave an  s  effect on both companies. There was a difference in company­
relateddat  response rates  because  MB  had a more severe legitimacy issue. 
legiTimacyResponse to / ri  gaps 
MacMillan Bloedel (Fig. 7). displayed high ratl' both{/(' /ul1 R/ l' ig MB a response c for 
industryI  and company-related gaps. As legitimacy gaps were directly derived 
I'rOI11 reports,"rom adverse media . the response rate to legitimacy gaps, although not 
as a. reports, 11u high  s the response rate for the actual . wi II share the comments that 
were made in the preceding subsection. The explanation for these lower (but 
nonetheless material) rdatedJJonet cl u c u] response rates  is that, often, many reports  elat  to a 
single re ponse "eriousl' gap. A s to one s  gap boosted the numher of media reports 
reportthat the company responded to. Conversely, a single n would also produce 
a gap.(J , to which  the company may not havt' responded because it was not.\ e
threatenlllg. Non-respon. e morcconsidered ·calenm s to this type of gap had e of an impact 
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Fig.i . 7.7. MR: Response tot  L~gitimacy (iaps.B: s llc'  egitim  Ga s. 
on response-to-gapr -t -  percentagesr t  lhan on response-to-media percenl<ll;es,t  r -l - i  ercentag , 
offbecJUse  thet  lowerl r usedsdenominatori t r  ini  tl1(' percental;eresponse-to-gapr -t -  uu  the rcentage 
calculations.l l ti . The responser  rater t  tot  botht  inJustry-reiated and company-specilici dustr -r l t  -s i fi  
legitimacyle iti ac  gapsa s wasas highesti est ini  199:\, thet e yearear off thet e mostst intensei te se MB-speeific3, -s ecific 
criticism.criticis . Thee averagea era e response raterate overer thet e five-yearfi e- ear perioderi  forf r eacheac  wasasres  e 
equale al atat T\Cfc. Thee responseres se wasas highesti est ini  MB's's worstrst year,ear, j 993. whene  thet e7."1,%. 1993, 
ratesrates wereere 86Cfu anda  84°1< rC'spectively.6% 4% respecti el . 
Domtar (Fig 8).8). Thehe legitimacylegiti acy gapsgaps wereere JeriveJ fromfro  mediaedia reports.reports. Thehe 
re 'ponses rates,rates, althoughalt  lessles, thant a  forf r thet e actualact al reports,re rts, share thet e samesa e 
o lar ( ig. derived 
res ses s ure 
media reports, ex.planation for thecommentsco ents asas thethe subsectionsubsection onon newsne s eJia reports. Thehe explanation Cor lhe 
lowerlo er responseresponse ratesrates wasas givengiven inin thethe MB case,case, andand willill notnot bebe dupJica1l:d here.here. 
Domtar'so tar's averageaverage responseresponse raterate off 58%58  forfor industry-relatedindustry-related gapsgaps wasas higherhigher 
duplicated 
thanthan thethe raIl' forfor company-specificco pany-specific reports,reports, whichhich wasas 44 j (ic. Thehe raIl'S rorror J9l) I ,rate J%. rates 1991, 
Domtar'so tar's worstorst year,year, wereere 500k andand 46%46  respectively.respectively.50% 
Cross-caseCross-case WhilehilerOl11parison.  MBB hadhad a highhigh responseresponse 10 bOlh industryindustry andandcomparison. a to both 
company-relatedco pany-related reports, Domtar focusedfocused moreore onon thethe industry.industry. Thishis isisreporls, orntar 
consistentconsistent withith thethe findingsfindings inin thethe previous subsection. TheThe differencedifference ininprcvivus ubsection. 
comrany-related responseresponse ratt's wasas becausebecause MB hadhad a moreore severesevere legitimacylegiti acy 
problemproble  thanthan Domtar.o tar. 
co pany-related rates a 
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Figif;. 8.R  Durntar: ResponseUllll  to Legitimacy Gaps. 
Tvpn of .)',ratcR icsSl g  
MorMillon Bloedel ([(ible .J and Fig. 9). Sub:;tantive, concrete strategies are 
generally more desirable to the relevant publics, while companies tend to favor 
uc a Ta j st t ie'
more co,;t-dfectivc symbolic assurances. For MB, over the period of the study, 
the mix between these two categories of strategies was almost reversed, from 
33% substantive in 1991 to 63 v/t to 37o/r 
st-ef e
TV/; 10 inCf  1995, and 67% symbolic in 1991 % 
1995. Therein .') n; was a shift toward more SOCially desirable strategies, indicating 
actual fitsCl changes in corrorate hehavior. This pattern h  into the legitimacy theory 
framewlll'k, with societal pressure resulting in concrete action, as the company 
changed to conform to societal demands and expectations. This indicates a 
nw or .
moregeneral trend toward becoming Ot'  isomorphic over time. 
In the substantive category, MB used role performance 144 times and 
CO('I'CII'(' i.\o/llorphisl/l once. The usc of the rolf! performance strategy showed('IT Ve "(I//wrr II e le 
an impressive Increase in 1993, compared with 1991 and 1992. This coincided 
the barrage of adverse media reports thaI MBt and the industry were 
d
with I  
subjected to in 1993.1)9  Isomorphism was again evident in the increase from 38 
substantivel  c rl'sponsese  in 1993J  to 55 in _MB not repon un1995 did OI attempt to rt o  
o(Ihe  the difficultmostusc  t l strategy of all. namely, that of tryingt  e f iL to allert  
sociall.\" il/stitllliolla/i::.ed practices."iu ly / l l ili //{ !i:l' l , 
f r, t:l '" '"-. ;;; '" ~. t:l § ~ ~
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Fig 9. Strategies.MB: Mix of l lc c  
symhl)lic mo tMB used eight out of a possible nine strategies.l1l)  The widelys   
used symbolic  strategy was that of espousingn~ socially Roals.acceptable(w  g  
140.Overall, it was used 45 times out of a total symbolic strategy usage of Itsl   
wa.'use particularlys  pronounced in 1993, the year  In which adverse company­
r lated news media  reports peaked and MB's quantity of environmentale
disclosure surged in defense of its legitimacy. The other two  symbolic 
strategies that enjoyed considerable usage,. were offering accounts and 
adJllissionmis  of guilt.uf"  Each was used 26 times. The admission of guilt strategy 
made 1995,started modestly in 1993, and then itscl  presence  felt in 1994 and J as  
MB became oftpring moreh  attuned  to societal expectations. The ofj   apologies 
was the one symbolic strategy that was not in MB's arsenal. From  an 
per. pective,accounting thes   most disturbing strategy was misrepresentation (for 
th wOrste example,o   see Appendix C). 
and fa).DOli/faromtn  (Tahle J3 Cln  Fig. For10).  Domtar, the mix between strategies 
changed, from 92 Yo , ubstantive to 79% in and1995.  8% symholic in. aln % ins  1991 ,
1991 to 21 % in 1995. This fits the legitimacy theory framework, with societal 
III 1991 re insulting  more concrete action, as the company changed topressure 10
environm tllal expectations.conform to demandsent  and AstiD   the company itself 
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Fig. Domtar: Strategies.R 10. norn Mix  of l' c  
was targeted less and less, so st.rategies shifted t.o provide morethe mix of rat rtt: i t:
symbolic assurances. However,t:  the predominant usce of substantive stratq,>:icsulegiv  
over this extended period indicates attempts at becoming isomorphic With its 
societal environment. Domtar used role perji)Jmlll/cefor an  99YY times, Ci!CrCil'Ccoerei 'e 
twice altering sociaflvl y institutionalized practices once.isomorphism and i K titutiOlwfi;:: wcticl!S
strategies, three typesDomtar made sparing use of symbolic . using only cl' tS out of 
possible nine over the five-y ar period. frequentlya i k t OVL:  c e L:ri The most n:y c  used symbolic 
socially acceptable ofstrategy was espousing iaf!.\; h goals. It was used 16 times out r 
symbolic symbolica total  strategy usage of 20. The other h  strategies used were 
offering conjcJrmi()'lnil1f!, accounts (three times) and ceremonial (·onjo ty (once). 
Cross-case comparison. MS,B  caught unawares in the throes of a legitimacy 
crisIs, Evidenced byiS S. used a wide variety of symbolic strategies. L c h  the use of all 
strat.egies, misrepresentation,but one of the symbolic t including senfatiol1  societal 
demands forced MB into portraying a higher degree of isomorphism. This was 
-trategies,confirmed by the increased propensity toward disclosing substantive st  
five-year conslstenlwhich replaced the symbolic, over the t period. This is also i t 
with Laughlin's (1991) writings. The bigger the exogenous shock, the greater 
philosophie ,the possibility of a change to an organization's core s. which in turn 
leads to substantive change. 
In contrast, Donltar\mtar's reactions are reflectedl t  by extensivet si e useuse ofof rolerole 
perJemnance from J991 92% werefC)Fl C nl onwards.1  In 1991,, of20/0  thet  strategiesstr te ies disclosedisclosed \vere 
environment.substantive, exhibiting changes in its behaviori  towardt r  thet  naturalt ral enVir0l11n t. 
85%.From 1992 to 1994, this declined to between 83% and In50/0. I  1995,1995, itit wasas 
79'10. As Domtar confornledm  to societalt l expectationst ti s and becalne more% . ecame 1110  
isomorphic, whenitsS0I110rphi  reported use of substantive strategies,t t i , althoughlt  substantials stantial \v en 
toconlpared  MB, decreased progressively.l . onlyDonltar l  usedse  threet ree typestypes ofofm mt r 
strategies.sylnbolic  usedWIB  eight.m M  
Domtar's reactions to societal weredelllands  responsiveInore r s si e andand tangibletangiblem  m  
than MB's, because D0I11tar useBlade  of substantivet ti  strategiestr t ies earlierearlier andand lnoreomt m  more 
frequently than MB. The of111ajority  strategiesD0111tar's tr t i s werere substantives bstantive inin 
of attempts becolne more 
majori  omta  
1991,J which  is indicative the cOlnpany'som '  tottelll ts t  ecome rn re 
isomorphic. Thereafter,l11orp i .  the use symbolic became a moreof strategiesnl i  tr t i s ecalne littlea little 1110  
prevalent. ~rhe trend reversed\vas  in the case of MB.. Domtart r alsoalso usedused fewerfe erTh w  
varieties of strategiessynlbolic  than MB.. Itt had a concreteI110re crete approachapproach totom  mo  
Jegi intin1ation,  contrast to MB's'  appearance of respondingsymbolical.ly responding [0to itsits 
crisisi i  ini  a statet t  of panici  or disarray.i . 
l i m t bolicall  
LIMITATIONSI  
Severalr l warrantliI11itations rr t First,1l1ention. irst, thet  studyst  isis tolitnited to voluntaryvoluntarylimitati s menti . limite  
disclosureenVirOnl1lenta] iscl s re ini  annuala al reports.re rts. Mandatorya at r  disclosureiscl s re isis excluded,excluded, 
becausebecause itit fallsfalls outsideoutside thethe scopescope ofof thethe researchresearch question.question. Second,econd, thethe authorsauthors 
e viro me tal 
recognizerecognize thatthat CSD cancan bebe viaIllade via COJll111Unication other111edia other thanthan thethemade communication media 
annualannual reportreport (e.g.(e.g. filingsfilings withith securitysecurity C0I11Inissions, conlpany ne\vsJetters, 
presspress releases, ne\vsnews media advertising~advertising, brochures).brochures). Fronl an 
commissions, company newsletters, 
paidreleases" paid n1edia andand rom an 
accountingaccounting perspective,perspective, anan explanationexplanation isis specificallyspecifically beingbeing soughtsought forfor 
voluntaryvoluntary disclosureenvironn1cntal disclosure inin annualannual reports.reports. Therefore,Therefore, thisthis studystudy is 
tolilnilecl to annualannual reports.reports. Third,Third, thisthis studystudy isis limitedli ited recordedto recorded CanadianCanadian 
environmental is 
Jimited to 
norms values. wasandnonDS and val Itues. It notas not possiblepossible toto controlcontrol forfor thethe effectseffects ofof thethe societalsocietal 
and110rrns and valuesvalues ofof exportI11ajor export clientsclients andand internationalinternational businessbusiness associatesassociatesnorms major 
ofof thethe corporationscorporations underunder investigation.investigation. Fourth,Fourth, conclusionsconclusions couldcould benot be drawndra nnot 
aboutabout thethe ofuse of thethe concealn-lent strategy.Jegitilnation strategy. IfIf ofuse of thetheuse concealment legitimation use 
strategyconcealrnenf strategy involvedinvolved non-disclosure,non-disclosure, wouldit would notnot havehave beenbeen detected,detected,concealment it 
theas the gapslegitin1acy gaps andand reportsne\vs reports whichto which thethe didcOll1panies did notas legitimacy news to companies not 
voluntarilyvoluntarily respondrespond couldcould havehave beenbeen dealtdealt withwith viavia disclosureInandatory disclosure or anmandatory or an 
alternativealternative C0l11111Unication Fifth,11ledium. Fifth, thisthis studystudy was designednot designed detectto detectcommunication medium. was not to 
specificspecific instancesinstances ofof ofnlinlicry of thethe disclosureenvironrnental disclosure otherof othermimicry environmental of 
organizations.organizations. AnyAny ofof thethe itenls disclosureor disclosure couldcould havehave resultedresulted fronl rnilnicry,items or from mimicry, 
but the results shovv'ow that adverse I11ediamed  reports have\vould  precededw any 
mimicry maythat111ilnic  have111a   occurred. 
CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
The purpose of this study was to theexal11ine  potential for theorylegit.inlacy  asami  it m  
an explanation for voluntary disclosureenvironnlental  in the annual reports ofm
Thec0I11panies.  hypothesis was tested on casest\VO  and cross-case conclusions 
were developed. For each case, the results were consistent with the hypothesis. 
ompani  wo
There were two reasons11lain  for the differences in trendst.he  found for the t\\lOmai  wo 
conlpanies.m m  
MB found itself in the throes of a nlajor crisis.legitil11acy  It appeared to be 
unprepared for the severity of the Clayoquot Sound-based attacks on its 
m itim  
whichlegitiInacy,  had the potential to affect111aterially  its financial condit.ion,m material  it  
earnings, liquidity and survival.ultin1ate  Because adversec0l11pany-specific tim ompany-s  
reports111edia  exceeded those directed at the industry, MB concentrated onmedi
warding off direct attacks.legiti111acy gitim  
D0111tar's 111ajor wasproblen1  site resultingcont&.lIninatiol1,  thefronl  use of 
wood preservatives at its old plants. Although it experienced from 
omtar'  maj lem ntamin n  m
attacks ron1 
within the inC0I111TIUnities  which these plants were situated, future clean-up 
costs were not expected to have an material Domtar's 
communiti  
adverse or effect111ateri   on 0111ta '  
future financial condition, earnings or liquidity. A far greater threat to D0111tar 
\vasw  an industry-related problenl,m  the call for an international boycott of 
Canadian forest products. Industry-related adverse media reports 
omt  
111edi  exceededl  
reports.c0111pany-specific  Consequently, putDotntar  etTortInore  into respond­ompany-speci  m m  
ing industry-related10  issues.legitinlacy  
The second reason for the difference in trends that\vas  D0l11tar'sw  omt '  111ainmai  
legitimacy problem, contamination, mandatory 
to m
giti111  siteblelTI   wasru  subject to disclosure111andat   
requirements. The findjngsi i  providei  thet  followingll i  directionsi ti  for futuretnl . 
research: 
To provide quantitative supportenlpirical  for theorylegitin1acy  as anm itim  
explanation for disclosure,environlnental , researchers could test whether them  
quantitytit  by(lneasured  ofnU111ber  pages of disclosure)i l  and qualitylit  (nleasuredm  umb  m  
by substantivet ti  as opposed tot  strategies)sYlTIbolic t t i  of disclosurei l  are positivelyiti lymboli  
related to the nlagnitude by(nleasured  ofnU111ber  adverse 111edia ofreporls)  am m umb  medi  t
cOlllpany's gaps.legitinlacy . 
Use thet  hypothesist i  and research designi  ini  thist i  studyt  tot  investigatei ti t  an 
om '  l itim  
organization that is perceived to be a 'green'' ' leaderJ11arket  in its industry withmar  
regard to disclosure.environnlental .m  
Other suggestions for future research, which have a broader focus and 
legitimacy with other  social theories are (1) the incorporation ofintegrate i [ rn
classical perspectivesJ political8  economy theory andy   stakeholder theory into the 
suggested framework, as suggested by Gray et al. and(1995a),  (2) the oflIse ! S us
legitimation examinestructuration theory, of which isln  an integral part, to then1   
processlnanagernent  behind the ofinit.iation  disclosureenvironlnental  (see 
Buhr, 1997). A particularly interesting case for this would be MacMillan 
Bloedel. 
m m iti m
A final suggestion for future research is to use a researchITIulti-case  designmulti-  
investigate example, examinationto otherl l  issues of concern to society, for ann1   ln  
of the annual report disclosure of the gun and enterlainu1enlrtainm t industries in 
America.reaction to the recent school shootings in nl  
important n1ediamThis research resulted in three contributions.nl  First, news 
reports were used as measure legitimacy.a of111eaSUr   organizational Second,liIn   three 
additional strategieslegitirnation  were identified. Third, a research design was 
presented that provides a structure for the identification of particular types of 
m
strategieslegitinlation  used by companies in their annual reports. Yin's (] 989)m 1  
we] l-establ caseished  study research design was used in an innovative ll1anner, 
thereby paving the way for replication by other accounting researchers. 
J l ma  
NOTES 
I. This paper steins thefrolll  lead author's doctoral dissertation at the University of 
Port Elizabeth. Prior versions were presented at the 1999 American 
m m
Accountingn1   
Association Midwest Regional and National Meetings. 
2. Equivalent to accountingH,abennasian  scholar Laughlin's'  (199]) 111orphogenetic 
change. 
aberm 1 morphogen  
3. Equivalent to Laughl (1991)in's  change.rnorphostatic l ' m
4. Those involving extensive public participation~art t , such as the Green Plan,
Sustainable Forests: A Canadian PartnersConlIl1itnlent,  in Sustainable ofDeveloplnenl mmitm  m t
Forests, theane!  Forest Practices Code of British COlulllbia.l ol m  
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CATEGORIES ENVIRONMENTAL�I ONMENTAI--,APPENDIX A. OFr-fEG   
DISCLOSURE� 
(1)� Environmental Policynl  
(2) Environll1entalir nm  Management Systemln (EMS)nl 
(3) Risk Managenlentm  -� spills, emissions, emuents,General (specifics under  nl 111uent  
contamination)land nl  
(4) Environlnentalm  Auditing
(5) Goals and Targets
(6) Legal Conlpliancem � - Court-related or General (specifics under spills, 
emissions, emuents, contamination)nl landffl  ln  
(7)� Management SystemOther andln  Disclosuretell1 
(8) Contamination RemediationLand andln  nl  
(9) Habitats
(10) Wastes 
(11) � EmissionsAir nl  
(12) Water Effluents 
(13) Spills 
(14)� II1 or1 Noise and Odours (other than where odours relate to categories 
12) 
(I S) Product15  Stewardship 
SpendingEnvironlnental ( 16) m
CostEnvironnlentaJ  Accounting(17) 1  m t l
(18) DevelopmentSustainable  Reporting 
Buhr &  (1996);FreedlTIan  United Nations (1994).Sources: edm  
B.APPENI)IX  GUIDELINES FOR CODINGD
T'he Context qf Codingrhe  / o [
decision'Three  rules will be used (Buhr, 1994, 346):
(I) Everything in the reportenvirOlll11ental  be\vill  considered environn1ental I � vi ronme / / ironm lw  
disclosure other than the following: aboutInfornlation  the cornpany, 110n­m m , no
environrnental interaction,C0I1111lunity  and health and safetyt  notlllatters tm communit  m  
directly related to the actionsenvironnlental  of the conlpany. 
(2)� For special sections in annual reports that are clearly devotedt  tot  
m m . 
environmental reporting,nl t J  everything \villw l be considered environrnentalir m t l 
Information company, non-environmentaldisclosure other than: aboutnl  the nl , ir nl t l 
interaction,c0l11nlunity , and healthlt  and safety notInatters  directlyi tl  relatedl t  totommuni  m tt  
the actionsenvironnlental  of the c0l11pany.m omp  
(3) Where the above two decision rules are theirrelevant,  unitt of contextt t will 
be thet  sectionti  heading,i , subsectionti  heading,i , paragraph or sentence,t , 
� . ]] 
whicheveri  isi  thet  applicable.Bl0St li l .most 
1J~fornlation tot  be CodedInformation 
Allll textt t be\vill  coded.. Thisi  includesi l  headings,i , graphs,r , explanatoryl t r  illustrationsill tr tiwill 
(without( it t whichi  thet  ofinlpact f thet  textaccolnpanying t t wouldl  be lost),l t), andim t m i  
captionsti s forf r photographs,t r s, butt nott thet  photographst r s thenlselves. Infornlation 
typest  thatt t will\vil.l from glossaries, 
t ms l s. I f rm ti  
be excludedl  codingfr nl i  are:r : Tablesl  off contents,t t , J ri , 
corporater r t  directories,ir t ri s, referencesr f r s tot  othert r availableil l  publications,li ti s, users r responser s s  
cardsr  enclosedl  withit  orr attachedtt  tot  reports,r rt , and regardinginfornlation r r i  thet  
productionr ti  off thet  report,r rt, common example 
i f rm ti  
a COlnnl0  beingnl l  i  alongl  thet  linesli s off "This" is 
(Bllhr~ 1994, 347-348).reportre rt wasas printedri te  on recycledrec cle  paper"a er" ( u r, 94, - ). 
J}~forn].{[tj()n Worksheeton orksheetjJroced[{}<es./or l?ec.'ording Procedures./or Recording Information on 
sectionrrhis section setssets outout thethe proceduresprocedures forfor thethe actualactual codingcoding process,process, thethe resultsresults ofofThis 
\\Jhich be11111St e recordedrec r e  on thet e worksheetr s eet (not( t reproducedre r ce  here,ere, butt availablea aila lewhich must 
request). A worksheet will completedupon .. separate.  vvorks be\v  forOIllpl r   each of the 1991 to 
company. follows:1995 financial years for each Thenl  procedures are as \v  
(I) � Environmental1 disclosurenl   in the annual report, and in any other publication
willrefelTed to in the annual report, be\vi11  identified, by taking cognizance of 
terms (1994,323-334),the  three  decision rules, the key identifiednlS  by Buhr 94,  
and  the  categories and subcategories identified in Appendix A. This 
will downdisclosure be\v  broken into\v   the various categories identified on the 
between mandatoryworksheet (to distinguish voluntary\v  and disclosurell1and   and 
provide framework for the data analysis), and the location orf theto  a nl
information will columnlll be\v  specified in the providedlU1l1   for this purpose. 
(2)� reflected in proportions of pages of aQuantity  of disclosure, standard 
letter-sized page (to the nearest I (70 of a page) will1 fo be\-vi   sho\vnw  per 
measurementssubcategory. These willI11eaSUren1cnt   be taken by using a transparent grid 
with  standard one inch all111argins  round, along the lines of the Gray et aI. 
study  (1995b, 84). Each block of the grid represents 1I% of a page of text. 
measurements number 
margi 1.
These  willn1easur nl l  then be aggregated to obtain a total ofn1  
pages  of disclosure per year for each cOlnpany.om  
O~-,APPENDIX C: EXAMPLES LEGITIMACY GAPS AND 
CORRESPONDING LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES 
F 
(italics).strategiesLegitinlalion  are shown in m t � 
The  year and ofnUlllber  reportsl11edia  giving rise to each gap are shown in 
[brackets] .� 
um medi  111� 
EXQlnple 1xam I 
1993  environmental I) be accountable,MB's  reportnl  (p. states1  its desire to 
worthy community, itof\\Jort  the public trust, a leader in the forest andC0l11111unit   says that 
welcomes eco-Iabeling (espousingi  socially acceptable goals). MB alsovvel n1
disclosed  details of actual to1110difications  processesnlill  and the installation 
of  new\v effluent treat111ent systems, to withconlply  new regulations 
modificati m
i atme nl m and 
pe'~lorJnance).standards  (role rj' m ). 
This  was  in response to the following gaps:legitilnacy m
MB's'  publicli  isilnage i  deterioratingt i ti  because of itsit  lackl  of concern for thetim  
environlnent [1991-3 1993-1 OJ it~  has criminallarge ofnun1ber  nl  
[1993-2] and charges pending [1993-1] forr   environmental 
m ;~ 1992-2;- ~ 0]; a m
convictions  nl  
offences; it engages in forestry practices contrary to thet  public interest 
[1993-5]  and isi  guiltyilt  of Britishlllisll1anaging iti  (BC)Colunlbian  forestst  undermi man i  l m i  
itsit  controltr l its[1993-5]; it  Portrt Albernil r i and RiverPowe]] i r pulpl  areIllills r  thet  \vOrSl[ - J; Jl mill  worst 
polluters in BC [1992-2]; pulp effluentn1ill  ism  polluting Canadian waters 
1991-6; highlyr ] 1992-3], discharging toxic  waste, including dioxins and furans 
andl1991-2],  exceeding levels bypennitted  guidelinesgovernlnent  and/or 
regulations [1991-2; 1992-5J;~  MB~  is unwilling to change its environIllentallyir m  
[ rmi m
unfriendly processes and practices [1991-4; 1992-2; 1993-8J, resulting in the 
991-2~ 1993-2t marketsdestruction of forest ecosystems []1 91-2; 1992-1; -2J; areIn   
demanding eco-labeling [1993-3].rn ofe I  forestry products J  
2Exanlple m
MB 's 1994\  annual environmental (p.4) that it hadreport . specified been 
convicted of only 15 offencesenvironlnental  in 25 years (Jnisrepresentation),m mis  
but violationsall  were unintentional and the result of breakdownequiplnent  orJ m
errorhurnan  (offering Inaccounts).  response, Greenpeace alleged, via Inedia 
reports, that there had been at least environmental 
m l m
86 violations.ir nn1  In two 
~MacBlosubsequent newspaper reports (Vancouver Sun, April 12, 1995, p. B2,, 
adlnitsm  to 4 more convictions' and Globe & Mail, April 13, 1995 
' ac l  
p.B6,lTIOr   
acknowledges'MacBIo  convictions'),environlnental  MB conceded that thel m
J994 annual reportenvironnlental  was inaccurate.m
This was in response to the following gaps:legitilnacy m
MB has a large ofnUlnber  convictionscrinlinal  for environmental offences 
[1993-2;~ 1994-3JJ  and a large ofnUJnber  charges pending for illegal 
um m
um  
environn1entalm  activities [1993-1; 1994-1 MBJ;  was the worst corporatel - ]  
olTender [1994-1 J, governmentinjJ  the BC forest industry violatedJ  guidelines/ln   
atainled  safeguarding streamssaln10n  and, in some instances, lied by}(l\VSlaws m lmo
111isclassifying sa]n10n tostrearns  avoid [1993-2;cOlnpliance  1994-5].misclas ifyi lmo m om
3EX{llnple xam  
1994 annual reportenvironillental  (p. 5) discloses fine of $206,000IVIB'sM '  m a 
(adJnission forql'guilt)  'inadvertently' (offering an account) harvesting tilTIbermi i o{ r im  
outside of approved cut block boundaries in Sound.Clayoquot  It explains that 
the area was designated for potential logging, though final approval had not 
1ay
been granted the(trivializing  issue).. Steps to itsilTIprOVe  boundary-n1arking 
technique have been taken to reduce the risk of a recurrence (role 
l  m ov  ary-m  
Lec  
peJ}c)rrnance).r/i) m  
This was in response to the following gaps:legitin1acy itim
MB illegally treesJogged  in the Clayoquot Sound rainforest or other parts ofl
1993-2~Vancouver Island [1992-1; 1994-4 andJ  was fined the Jargest aIllount3- ; ] l m  
in historyBe  and the penaltyn1axiInU111  under the Forest Act [1994-2]..C m ximum 
Example 4.\- n1p   
MB's (p.25) an example cOlllpany's1992 annual report . cited ofnl  how the om  
environmental formal regulatory Itrequirenlents.  reportedactionsn1  surpassed r111 1 m
higher than usual summer water nearten1peratures  its Alberni millthat n1nl \v m 111il  
salmon movement spawning.interfered with lIl10 and1110venle  MB,vv   together with govern­-
ment moved waterfisheriesIll  and Be Hydro, coldnl  into\v   the river, assisting the 
salmon completing co/~fonniry).upstream (ceremonial nformitinnl0  theirOIllpl t  journey ll rean1 nuJni
was legitimacyThis in\v  response to the following gaps:nl   
from millExcessive effluent discharges thell1  Alberni pulp arell1   poisoning or 
causing stress to fishJ  [1991-3;1-3~ 1992--4]; salmon100,000L  sockeye hadhn   died in 
the oxygen-depleted Alberni Inlet in 1990 (1991-1; 1992-1); there has been a 
progressive deterioration in water quality since the Alberni pulp has111ill  been 
in operation (1991-1). 
mil
